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Effects of the Federal Income Tax Structure and Social
Security on the Changing US Family Composition
Adam Michael Gray
From dual-earner, married couples, to opposite and same-sex cohabitation, America's family
structure, lifestyles, and attitudes have been changing in recent years. This paper provides a
framework of understanding how families interact and make economic decisions. It examines
whether external and internal benefits to family formation exist. The governnlent should develop
policies are both equitable and efficient depending on what benefits exist for society, if any.
Currently, one of the biggest gains married partners make occurs within the Federal Income Tax
and Social Security Systems. However, this structure was created at a time when families were
very traditional-a working husband and childrearing, non-working wife. This structure will be
simulated to show how America's changing family structures are being affected by this
obsolescent model. Results provide evidence that nlore and more families are becoming
economically disadvantaged because they do not get the same tax incentives and benefits that
married, traditional families do.
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I.

Introduction

Recent news has focused on promoting traditional lifestyles and banning or discouraging
all others. However, an overview of society shows that the proportion of traditional families is
declining. Traditional families are those consisting of one man and one woman living together
with the possibility of children, either biological or adopted. Non-traditional families include
divorced families, single-parent families, opposite-sex partners, and same-sex partners. The US
government legally recognizes one type of family: opposite-sex, married partners. This
recognition provides tax breaks, insurance benefits, and life and death decision making for the
spouse and children. If this is the case, what are the economic consequences for being outside of
this traditional definition of family?
This research studies the effects that the current Federal Tax structure and Social Security
structure have on varying types of families in the US. This research examines the theories of
both family and tax formation. The theory ofthe family is important in analyzing family
formation and its economic benefits. Finally, the research discusses the theory of taxation with
respect to the current tax structure in the US. It will become evident that the current structure is
inequitable as well as inefficient. Currently, the US follows a non-marriage-neutral policy,
moreover, developing policies that benefit the traditional family. This stance leads to economic
inefficiencies and discrimination. Therefore, this research argues that marriage-neutrality is
preferable on both equity and efficiency grounds.
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II.

Changing Nature of the Family - Empirical Evidence
Household Structures from 1970 to 2000
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The chart above shows household structural changes from 1970 to 2000. The two groups
represented are non-family households and family households. Family households include
married couples with or without children and singles (whether divorced or not) who are raising
children or live in some other type of family arrangement. Non-family households include single
men and women as well as other households that do not fit the typical "traditional family"
definition, such as opposite-sex and same-sex cohabitants.
As seen in the chart, the composition of households and families along with marital status
and living arrangements has changed significantly since the 1970s. Married couples with and
without children have declined from 70% of total households to less than 53%. The number of
marriages in the US shows annual growth of 0.7%. This increase, however, has been far slower
than that of other types of family structures, which average 3% annual growth (CPR, 2001).
Thus, in relative terms, non-family households, including singles and opposite-sex and same-sex
cohabitants, have slowly increased, now representing almost half of total households.
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Therefore, this notion of "traditional family" is becoming obsolescent. Instead of the
typical working male, house-making female, and children, we have more singles, divorcees,
opposite-sex families, and same-sex families. These changes have several economic
implications including family formation and tax consequences.

III.

The Economic Gains from Family Formation
Why do families form at all? Of course, one reason is love. However, it is impossible to

measure one's love for another precisely; therefore, the focus will return to economics.
According to neoclassical analysis of the family, "adult members make informed and rational
decisions that result in maximizing the utility or well-being of the family" (Francine Blau,
Marianne Ferber, Anne Winkler, 2006). With these assumptions, economists are able to model
family formation as well as other human behaviors including divorce, children's outcomes, and
increases in female labor participation rates.
Since the family is the economic unit in the US, the government must see its importance,
thereby promoting bonds of traditional marriage and family through policies that protect and
benefit the family. However, in order to decide whether the government should intervene to
encourage families, traditional or otherwise, it must consider if the net benefits from family
formation are largely internal to the family, or whether there are important positive externalities
for society as a whole.
If there are important external benefits to family formation, then subsidies to families
such as more favorable tax treatment-may be justified on both equity and efficiency grounds.
In addition, if these external benefits accrue to non-traditional families as well as traditional
ones, then non-traditional families should receive these same subsidies. Conversely, if the
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benefits are fundamentally internal to the family, then to be equitable and efficient, the
government should not intervene, thereby taking a neutral stance toward family formation.

A.

Specialization according to comparative advantage (Division of Labor)

According to Gary Becker's theory of the family, given scarce resources, people
optimize, trying to gain more than they lose. Therefore, couples must see benefits by grouping
their resources and specializing in household or labor force production.
Division of labor is an important reason for family formation. Muller claims, "The
family facilitates specialization and enables the spouses to exploit comparative advantages [... J
(2002)." Traditionally, women have had a comparative advantage in housework, while their
male counterparts are more effective in the workplace. Together they add to total production and
combined, maximize their utility (Blau et. aI., 2006). Ifleft apart, neither would function
efficiently (Eskridge, 1996). Through this division of labor and exploitation of comparative
advantages, the two combine shared resources, thereby reducing their economic cost.
Does division of labor differ across types of families? Can same-sex couples and non
married, opposite-sex couples enjoy this benefit? According to Becker, the inherent biological
differences make women more suitable for homemaking and childrearing while men are more
suitable for the labor force. However, since the 1970s, the labor force has included a growing
proportion of dual-earning couples. Dual-earners are those in which both husband and wife
participate in paid labor. Beginning in 1976, dual-earners emerged as the predominant structure
among married couples rising from 50 to 60% of all such families (Blau et. aI., 2006). Borjas
has found that female labor force participation went from 42.8% in 1960 to over 74% in 1991
among women aged 25 to 54 (2000). Moreover, as a woman ages, she is more likely to enter the
work force.
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Economically, women have entered the work force for many reasons. First, their wage
rate has increased, therefore, providing incentive to allocate less time to household production
and more time to paid labor. Second, fertility rates among women have fallen. From 1950 to
1989, lifetime fertility rates of adult women fell from 3.3 to 2.0 children (Borjas, 2000). This
decrease in fertility could be from any number of reasons: birth control, abortion, government
transfer programs, or even the increased cost of raising children. Thirdly, technological
advances in the home have likely led to more workers in the labor force. In the past 30 years, we
have seen great advancements in technology. A few of these include improved stoves, washers,
dryers, microwaves, and many other time saving devices. Borjas claims that these technological
advances have led to a decrease in the marginal product of household production lessening the
need for specialization and exchange (2000).
Apparently, then, the comparative advantages that result from biological differences
between men and women have declined (Muller, 2002). Since the cost of household production
has decreased and both men and women can be very productive in the labor force, couples are
seeing gains by both working and being dual-earners. This additional money allows these
couples to experience higher standards of living.
Muller's research claims that, "Even without full specialization [marriage] can exploit the
full gains from the division oflabor without giving up efficiency (2002)". This challenges the
appropriateness of Becker's economic model explaining division oflabor. The man does not
have to work while the woman stays at home to realize gains from specialization. With women's
increased labor participation rates, it is no longer the case that both partners completely differ in
their production abilities or human capital. Partners will specialize in the production activity for
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which they have the most human capital. Since this is not complete specialization, each split
their production to some extent in both the home and in paid labor.
This new model provides a better explanation of how division oflabor for dual-earner
couples works. Since this model does not reflect biologically determined gender roles, it
provides a rationalization why homosexual unions can gain from specialization (Muller, 2002).
Finally, do these benefits accrue internally or externally? Since the only people who
realize the benefit of living together and dividing their time between household and labor activity
are the individuals of that couple, the benefits are largely internal. Therefore, this conclusion
suggests that the government should take a marriage neutral position since society, as a whole,
does not necessarily receive any benefit from the traditional family.
B.

Economies of Scale
By conjoining, couples also experience economies of scale in allocating income within

the household. This experience exists to the extent that with the increase of inputs, or people,
there is less than a proportionate increase in cost (Eskridge, 1996). For example, it is cheaper to
live together in one house than to own two separate houses. Grocery buying has a fixed cost for
one person, but a lower marginal cost as additional people are added. A vacation for two is
proportionally less expensive than a vacation for one since you can share travel (ifby car), room,
and food. When couples share goods such as entertainment, food, housing, utilities, information,
and even children, the costs are lower.
Obviously, any grouping of people can realize this benefit, regardless of whether it is a
married couple, opposite-sex couple, same-sex couple, or just friends. Therefore, this benefit
does not differ with type of family. Two can live nearly as cheaply as one by pooling and
sharing resources. Furthermore, these benefits accrue internally. Only the people who take part
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reap the benefit, no one else-therefore, again, implying the government should take a marriage
neutral stance.
C.

Family-Specific Investments and Risk Pooling

Besides division of labor and economies of scale, there are of course many more
advantages to forming families. There are many marriage-specific investments made through
marriage. Various skills and knowledge develop as family members learn from and about each
other. Examples include cooking, cleaning, hobbies (like rock-climbing, bird watching, or
reading), and even childrearing. Many of these would not occur without the other individual in
one's life. In addition, couples can pool their risk. Ifboth spouses work, they have the added
benefit of relying on the other one's income in case one must leave the work force. Arguably,
couples face many possibilities ifboth spouses work. There is more stability to allow for major
career changes, pursue additional education, or receive job training (Blau et. aI., 2006).
Family groupings in any sense are important because they provide financially and
economically stable households, especially for those in which a partner does not work. On the
other hand, ifboth partners work, they have additional security in case one should lose his or her
job. This pooling of risk also provides a social relationship that has many positive effects,
especially emotionally. In addition, these units can create protective, stable environments for
children and their education (Weisberg, 1975). Further, Folbre describes the family as the
"primary site for the care, training, and maintenance of people-the day-to-day as well as long
run reproduction ofthe labor force" (Badgett, 2001). Therefore, couples who invest in each
other gain both emotional and economic stability.
Like economies of scale, any grouping of people can benefit from these "marriage"
specific benefits and risk pooling. By living together, people can learn from each other and take
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care of each other during hard times. Again, these benefits are largely internal. No one benefits
from two people who pool their risk except those two people. For instance, if one spouse loses
his or her job and mustshare the income of the other, the only one receiving that benefit is the
partner who faces downsizing. In addition, the investments made with each other only benefit
each other. If a couple goes on a vacation and enjoys it, their increase in emotional stability has
no bearing on the emotional or even economic stability of society as a whole. This argument
further justifies the marriage neutrality argument.

D.

Children
Becker argues that, among other things, the main purpose of the family is "the production

and rearing of children" (Badgett, 2001). The question of childrenis an important issue raised
when discussing the importance of the family. Of all the discussed benefits of family formation,
this one seems to be the only one that may have external benefits outside of the family.
Internally, parents receive direct benefits from having children and should bear responsibility for
their care and education (Blau, Ferber, and Winkler, 2006). However, externally, the nation also
benefits when children grow up to be healthy, educated, good citizens. When properly raised
they can be very productive adding value to the economy. Further, Blau, Ferber, and Winkler
point out that when children are less of a burden and well cared for, the parents are not absent as
much and have increased employment stability (2006). Therefore, benefits accrue to the parents,
the community, employers, and the government.
Children's outcomes across family structures are a common topic. Evidence suggests
that children who come from families where both biological parents are present seem to do better
than those children raised by single parents (Blau et. al. 2006). However, correlation does not
imply causation. Therefore, many researchers still wonder to what extent family structure plays
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a role in the economic and emotional support of children. However, it is arguable that any
family structure where loving people are present and provide emotional and economic support is
beneficial to those children. In addition Blau et. al. maintain that growing up in other family
structures, such as single parent households, may only increase the risk of outcome failure, not
assure it (2006).
To sum up, this research so far has concluded that families form and are important for
many economic reasons. Traditional family structures seem to be fading and new types of
families are emerging. Like traditional marriage, opposite-sex and same-sex cohabitation offer
partners companionship, affection, and love, as well as all the aforementioned benefits,
especially the ability to share economic resources and realize economies of scale (Blau et. aI.,
2006).
However, should the government subsidize family formation? Aside from children, we
have seen that the benefits are mainly internal. By a man and a woman marrying, they receive
the benefits described. However, does that make the single person next door better off? What
about the gay couple next door? It does not. Since they get no benefits, they should not have to
subsidize the marriage. Therefore, on efficiency grounds, the tax system should be marriage
neutral.
Currently marriage-neutrality is not the case in the US. Married couples enjoy
institutional advantages, including, but not limited to, health insurance, pension rights, Social
Security benefits, and Federal Income Tax benefits (Blau et. aI., 2006). Since these benefits do
not extend to couples in alternative lifestyles, they face discrimination because they may pay
higher taxes.
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IV.

Federal Income Tax
It is necessary to analyze this marriage-neutrality argument on both efficiency and equity

grounds. Without neutrality, the tax code provides incentives for couples to either marry or
remain single depending on the taxes owed. Further, since we have uncovered no important
external benefits to family formation, there is no efficiency case for treating individuals
differently depending on their family composition. This implies that the tax code should tax the
individual and not the family.
Besides efficiency, equity is also important to this marriage-neutrality argument. Equity
is the concept of fairness or justice in economics. Fairness requires vertical and horizontal equity
among the relevant units. Vertical equity is the idea that those with greater income have a
greater ability to pay. If those with a greater ability pay more, disproportionately, then this is
progressivity. The US has a progressive tax structure. It is arguable that this leads to class
warfare, but Steuerle argues that without vertical equity, you defy natural tax theory: "That is,
some progresivity -greater contributions to the community by those who are more capable of
contributing-is apparent in nature when the stronger or older of species support the weaker or
younger" (C. Eugene Steuerle, 2004). Therefore, progressivity is appropriate for humans and
our tax structure. Redistribution is necessary to pay for government and to pay for the services
that people need.
Horizontal equity is the idea that those with similar ability to pay taxes should pay the
same amount. Further, it is the concept of tax neutrality or the idea that the tax system should
not discriminate between similar things or people. Steuerle states, "Horizontal equity is the
given of all principles affecting government policy." Economists believe that it is a principle of
good government. With progressive rates-presumed necessary for vertical equity-marriage

Gray 11
neutrality requires that one define horizontal equity in terms of individuals, not families. In fact,
until 1948 taxes were levied on individuals, not families. Nonetheless, in 1948 the government
began using the traditional family as the economic unit (Rosen, 2002). Therefore, there is
horizontal equity across families, not individuals.
Adhering to vertical equity, horizontal equity, and marriage neutrality will lead to some
degree of discrimination. Since the three are never met, some group(s) will always be
discriminated. With the recent shifts in the demographics of families, culture and society's
beliefs toward the role of the family influence the choice of tax structure. Same-sex couples are
at a bigger disadvantage because their union is not legally recognized. On the other hand,
opposite-sex, non-married unions could be recognized through domestic partnerships, common
law marriage, or even through civil marriage. Therefore, the inherent structure of the Federal
Income Tax structure is damaging the economic outcomes of families and individuals in the US.
V.

Social Security

We have seen how the federal income tax affects all types of individuals and their
relationship status. The principles discussed are useful in considering not only if the federal
income tax is fair and efficient, but also to see if the Social Security system is fair and efficient.
Social Security is a primary source of subsistence for many elderly in the US. The benefits that a
recipient receives depend on his or her marital status. An individual can claim Social Security
benefits based on his or her spouse's earning history. A widow/er can receive additional benefits
upon the death of his or her spouse. A spouse of a disabled individual, eligible for Social
Secu~ty,

may claim additional benefits if that spouse is raising the disabled individual's child.

Finally, a spouse who is at least 62 years old may claim additional benefits based on his or her
spouse's disability (Dougherty, 2005). Moreover, a spouse can receive Social Security

Gray 12
retirement benefits equal to or greater than the benefits he or she is necessarily entitled to receive
based on his or her own earnings history (Dougherty, 2005). Unfortunately, the only ones able
to claim Social Security are the living individuals and their partners through legal marriage.
Like the federal income tax structure, many criticisms, even more severe, exist
concerning the Social Security system. The Social Security system also poses problems of
equity between two groups of people: one-earner married couples and all others (unmarried
couples, single people, and same-sex couples). The biggest problem with this system is that
payroll taxes are based on each individual's employment history, while Social Security benefits
are based on the family (Blau et. aI., 2006). In order to receive benefits, individuals must reach
some level of pay from jobs covered by Social Security for 10 years. Spouses of covered
workers are entitled to receive Social Security benefits equal to 50% of the amount received by
the covered worker, and survivor benefits of 100% if that covered worker should die, even if the
survivor never paid payroll taxes (Blau et. aI., 2006). The current Social Security system favors
families with a full-time homemaker over all others. As long as the husband is paying payroll
taxes, the family receives the maximum 150% of his Social Security benefit. Naturally, these
inconsistencies violate the rule of horizontal equity (Blau et. aI., 2006). For instance, if a wife
works she pays in as much as she would if she were single, but only the one who earns less than
her husband receives additional benefits over and above what she earns herself. Never married
women, single women who never work, and divorced women, who were married less than 10
years, receive benefits based upon their own record only. Therefore, this system affects people
who are not married. Since same-sex couples are unable to marry, then they are truly
disadvantaged because they cannot receive any benefits through their partners.
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Now that we have analyzed the theory, the tax structure, and the Social Security system,
we now look at the economic cost of the two family groupings--non-traditional and traditional-
in light of these regulations. Since it appears that there is some inefficiency and inequality in the
tax structure and Social Security system, I hypothesize that the tax burdens for non-traditional
families will be much higher than traditional, married, opposite-sex couples.

VI.

Empirical Model and Data
By focusing on the Federal Income Tax and Social Security, we can quantitatively

illustrate how non-traditional couples are discriminated against compared to those who are
legally married (traditional families). This research design uses simulations to test the
differences between the two groups: legally married couples and couples who must file
separately and singly. In addition, I use these same simulated couples to compare the different
outcomes between the two groups via the Social Security structure.
The research assumes that the simulated couples have no dependents (i.e. no children),
and no itemized deductions. I assume that they take the standard deduction, as most do. Further,
the assumed income does not include retirement savings, mortgage interest, or any other kind of
interest or profit shares. For Social Security purposes, the assumed birthday of all couples is
June 15, 1965 and, if they were to die, they would die on November 17,2005. The retirement
age for full benefits is 70 years old in the year 2035. The tax year used is 2005.
The programs used for this analysis are basic calculators found on the Internet. For the
Federal Income Tax, I use the Internal Revenue Service's Online 2005 Withholding Calculator.
It allows use of the basic assumptions mentioned before. To research the Social Security

question, I use the Social Security Administration's Online Social Security Quick Calculator. To
estimate projected earnings, the program uses an automatic-inflation adjustment. It uses
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estimated future cost-of-living adjustments* (COLAs) and estimated future percentage increases
in the national average wage increase (AWl). These estimates are derived from the
"intermediate" assumption in the 2005 Trustees Report. This is an annual report of the Federal
OASDI (Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance) trustees. The report predicts current and
projected financial status ofthe trust fund. The particular COLA is for December of 2005 and
was determined in October of2005.
To recapitulate, this research hypothesizes that traditional and non-traditional couples
will have differences in their tax liabilities and Social Security benefits even when they have
similar incomes. This result is because the government uses the tax codes to provide benefits for
married couples. Since the family is the economic unit used in the US, they are taxed at different
progressive scales than singles. Furthermore, same-sex couples and opposite-sex (non-married)
couples, must apply as single even if they are in a committed "family" situation.
The other aspect affecting same-sex couples is within Social Security. Since people pay
as they go and put money toward Social Security, they build value up for retirement. If couples
are married, then a person who has possibly never worked can claim benefits based on spousal
earnings. Other families outside the traditional definition are denied benefits and thereby
negatively affected by this regulation.
VII.

Results
The following tables show Federal Income Tax and Social Security Benefit simulations

for three types of couples with 15 sets of income assumptions. Table 1 presents the Federal
Income Tax liabilities faced by the two comparison groups. For instance, the first line shows
that if each partner made $12,500 dollars a year for a combined household income of $25,000
per year, their tax liability would be $866.00 as a Non-traditional couple and $863.00 as a
• Please see Appendix for more information about these tools and the COLA table.
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Traditional couple. Their tax difference is $3.00, which is a .01 % difference in the two different
tax liabilities.
Table 1
Federal Income Tax Liabilities in US
Dollars
Comparison Groups - Tax liability

Income Assumptions
Person 1

Person 2

Total
Income

$25,000.00

Tax Differences
NT-T
couples % of income

Non-traditional

Traditional

Couples filing
Singly

Couples filing
Jointly

$866.00

$863.00

$3.00

0.01%

546.00

2.18%

$12,500.00

$12,500.00

5,000.00

20,000.00

25,000.00

1,409.00

863.00

0.00

25,000.00

25,000.00

2,159.00

863.00

1,296.00

5.18%

25,000.00

25,000.00

50,000.00

4,318.00

4,314.00

4.00

0.01%

20,000.00

30,000.00

50,000.00

4,318.00

4,314.00

4.00

0.01%

0.00

50,000.00

50,000.00

7,121.00

4,314.00

2,807.00

5.61%

37,500.00

37,500.00

75,000.00

8,068.00

8,064.00

4.00

0.01%

25,000.00

50,000.00

75,000.00

9,280.00

8,064.00

1,216.00

1.62%

0.00

75,000.00

75,000.00

13,371.00

8,064.00

5,307.00

7.08%

50,000.00

50,000.00

100,000.00

14,242.00

14,236.00

6.00

0.01%

25,000.00

75,000.00

100,000.00

15,530.00

14,236.00

1,294.00

1.29%

0.00

100,000.00

100,000.00

20,218.00

14,236.00

5,982.00

5.98%

70,000.00

70,000.00

140,000.00

24,242.00

24,340.00

-98.00

-0.07%

40,000.00

100,000.00

140,000.00

24,839.00

24,340.00

499.00

0.36%

0.00

140,000.00

140,000.00

31,411.00

24,340.00

7,071.00

5.05%

For nearly every level of assumed incomes, non-traditional couples pay more federal
taxes than traditional couples who are married and file jointly. I hypothesized that traditional
couples would have fewer tax liabilities than other couples would because the two groups face a
different tax progression that subsidizes the non-working female. However, it is interesting to
note that the two couples are treated nearly the same when both partners in the relationship work
and have similar income. Non-traditional couples become more disadvantaged as the income
disparity between the two partners increases such as in the case when Person 1 has no income
and Person 2 earns all the income. While the percent of income difference is not too high, it
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does add up to a lot of money, especially as the couple earns more income. For instance, if
Person 1 does not work and Person 2 makes $75,000, they pay 7% ($5,307) higher taxes than
their legally married counterpart does. Benefit differences do not favor one grouping of incomes
either. Both high-income and low-income couples face increased liabilities.
It is interesting that the two comparison groups face the same tax consequences when

both incomes are about the same. This supports the argument that the current tax structure is
unfair and biased towards traditional household couples where the husband works and the wife
does not. However, we found earlier that there were no external benefits to society from this
arrangement, and that even the internal benefit due to comparative advantage seems to have
waned. This finding has important public policy implications and should be considered by the
government.
Table 2
Social Security Benefits in Year 2035* US Dollars
Income Assumptions
Comparison Groups 
Person 1

Person 2

Total
Income

$12,500.00
5,000.00
0.00
25,000.00
20,000.00
0.00
37,500.00
25,000.00
0.00
50,000.00
25,000.00
0.00
70,000.00
40,000.00
0.00

$12,500.00
20,000.00
25,000.00
25,000.00
30,000.00
50,000.00
37,500.00
50,000.00
75,000.00
50,000.00
75,000.00
100,000.00
70,000.00
100,000.00
140,000.00

$25,000.00
25,000.00
25,000.00
50,000.00
50,000.00
50,000.00
75,000.00
75,000.00
75,000.00
100,000.00
100,000.00
100,000.00
140,000.00
140,000.00
140,000.00

Household Social Security
Benefit
NonTraditional
Traditional
$4,936.00
$4,936.00
4,741.00
4,459.00
3,624.00
5,436.00
7,248.00
7,248.00
7,246.00
7,246.00
8,704.00
5,803.00
9,554.00
9,554.00
9,427.00
9,427.00
10,327.00
6,885.00
11,606.00
11,606.00
10,509.00
10,509.00
11,437.00
7,625.00
13,338.00
13,338.00
12,633.00
12,633.00
7,638.00
11,457.00

* Present Value of$2.80 to be received in 2035, is a

Benefit Differences
NT-T
couples

$0.00
-282.00
-1,812.00
0.00
0.00
-2,901.00
0.00
0.00
-3,442.00
0.00
0.00
-3,812.00
0.00
0.00
-3,819.00

roximately equivalent to $1.00 today.

0/0 on
income

0.00%
-5.95%
-33.33%
0.00%
0.00%
-33.33%
0.00%
0.00%
-33.33%
0.00%
0.00%
-33.33%
0.00%
0.00%
-33.33%
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Tables 2 and 3 show Social Security benefits and Social Security Survivor benefits,
illustrating how the two groups are affected in their retirement years. Table 2 shows how much
benefit the couples will receive in their retirement in 2035. Again, the dollar figures are
inflation-adjusted for 2035. The results in Table 2 suggest that the Social Security system is
more biased than the Federal Income Tax structure. In the cases where the first person does not
work and does not have any Social Security earnings, slbe loses about 50% of the spouse's
income compared to married couples. However, if both partners in both groups work and pay
their share to Social Security and qualify, both groups generally receive the same earnings as
would be expected. Since theory suggests that both partners likely work in non-traditional
families, they are likely to earn Social Security benefits on their own and not likely to be too
affected by being denied these benefits. In addition, couples are financially advised not to rely
on Social Security and to rely on other retirement savings. Therefore, this may not affect as
many couples.
Table 3 shows a rather dismal outlook on one particular section of Social Security:
survivor benefits. The dollar figures shown are the additional monthly benefit a partner would
receive today (year 2005) ifhis or her spouse should die. For married couples, if a Social
Security qualified spouse should die, the survivor, even one who never paid into Social Security,
can qualify for 100% of their deceased spouse's Social Security income. Since other types of
couples are denied marriage rights, they are unqualified for any type of survivor benefits and lose
the entire benefit. This is detrimental for those couples that may have had one partner who never
worked and put anything toward Social Security. Not only do these couples lose their partner
whom they never were able to marry, they lose all their income.
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Table 3
Additional Social Security Survivor Benefits - Death as of
Today *
Income Assumptions

Person 1
$12,500.00
5,000.00
0.00
25,000.00
20,000.00
0.00
37,500.00
25,000.00
0.00
50,000.00
25,000.00
0.00
70,000.00
40,000.00
0.00

Person 2
$12,500.00
20,000.00
25,000.00
25,000.00
30,000.00
50,000.00
37,500.00
50,000.00
75,000.00
50,000.00
75,000.00
10,000.00
70,000.00
100,000.00
140,000.00

Total Income
$25,000.00
25,000.00
25,000.00
50,000.00
50,000.00
50,000.00
75,000.00
75,000.00
75,000.00
100,000.00
100,000.00
100,000.00
140,000.00
140,000.00
140,000.00

Comparison Groups - Additional Household Soc.
Sec. Benefit
Traditional
Non Traditional
Add. Survivor
Person 2
Person 1
benefits for
Survives
Survives
either Person
$654.00
$654.00
$0.00
309.00
819.00
0.00
0.00
930.00
0.00
930.00
930.00
0.00
1040.00
819.00
0.00
0.00
1479.00
0.00
1204.00
1204.00
0.00
930.00
1479.00
0.00
0.00
1825.00
0.00
1479.00
1479.00
0.00
930.00
1825.00
0.00
0.00
2065.00
0.00
1774.00
1774.00
0.00
2065.00
1259.00
0.00
0.00
2114.00
0.00

* Figures represented in Today's Dollars
VI.

Public Policy Implications and Conclusion
In this research, we have seen that families are important for both economic and non

economic reasons. As alternatives to marriage or traditional families, singles adopting, oppositesex cohabitants and same-sex cohabitants can form economically and emotionally fruitful
relationships. Economic benefits accrue to any grouping of people regardless of gender or any
other social dimension. Since these benefits are largely internal, the government should design
tax laws and regulations that are marriage-neutral. Otherwise, the economic outcome may be
inefficient and unfair. People should be free to choose who to commit to and how to pool their
resources without interference from government entities.
Notwithstanding, the Federal Income tax structure and Social Security System seems to
affect even married couples that have both partners working and making about the same amount
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of money. Even if the government is discouraging other family formations, nontraditional
family structures are evolving, moving away from this traditional family of a working father and
homemaker wife to all types of groupings, including opposite-sex and same-sex relationships.
According to Weisberg, a lag in the law exists. There have been social changes that have
occurred in society (1976). These changes include increased female labor participation and
growing tolerance and acceptance of opposite-sex and same-sex cohabitating couples. However,
the tax system, Social Security System, and other legal regulations have not adapted to these
social changes. Therefore, discrimination exists, causing friction in society across classes.
These social changes require changes in the law. The government must take a marriage-neutral
stance in its government policies, especially in taxation and Social Security. Marriage-neutral
policy would not promote or discourage family formation. Horizontal and vertical equity for
individuals achieves fair and efficient policy. Moving back to taxing the individuals of a couple
is nothing radical. Even when non-traditional families were not prevalent, the government taxed
individuals and not the family unit.
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Appendix
Tools used in this research came from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and Social Security
Administration (SSA). These are simple calculators with basic assumptions to give the user an
approximate tax liability and projected Social Security benefits, by no means are they allinclusive or representative of one's true situation. The tools are at the following websites:
http://www.irs.gov/individuals/page/0..id=14806.00.html
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/quickcalc/calculator.html
The following table is part of the formula for considering the estimated cost ofliving adjustment
and for future value earnings. This data comes from the SSA website.
Table A
COLAs & A WI increases under the
intermediate assumptions ofthe 2005
Trustees Report
Increase
COLA
in
Calendar
year
AWl
(Percent)
(percent)

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014 and later
a

Average increase.

4.1
2.2
2.7
2.8
2.8
2.8
2.8
2.8
2.8
2.8

4.1
4.2
4.3
4.2
4.1
4
4
4.1
4
3.9 a
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